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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No. 19076 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and WAYNE A. OLSEN, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves a determination by the Industrial 
Commission that defendant Olsen has sustained a compensable 
industrial injury, which determination is contested by plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
This case was heard by an Industrial Commission adminis-
trative law judge on October 1, 1982. On October 5, 1982, an 
order awarding Defendant Olsen certain benefits was entered by 
the Commission. 
A Motion Requesting Transcript of Hearing and Extension of 
Time for Filing of Motion for Review was filed on October 20, 
1982. A Motion for Review was filed by the plaintiff-appellant 
on December 10, 1982. Appellant's Motion for Review was denied 
an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah dated February 24, 
1983. A Petition for Review was filed on March 23, 1983 in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have this Court determine that defenda· 
Olsen was a volunteer and not an employee of plaintiff at t·. 
time he sustained his injury and that a volunteer is not entitle 
to compensation benefits under the Utah Workmans Compensate·· 
Act. 
OF FACTS 
Mr. Wayne A. Olsen, defendant-respondant, is a carpente:· 
contractor. In the fall of 1981, Mr. Olsen approache3 h:• 
friend, Mr. David Haight, a shop teacher at Mountain Vie1,o,1 P.i:· 
School, about the possibility of using equipment at the Hi:· 
School to build a personal project. Mr. Haight agreed that ,., 
Olsen could use the school's equipment so long as he didc.'· 
interfere 1,o,1ith the student's use of the equipment. ( Transcrif'. 
P· 5) 
While Mr. Olsen was working on his personal project, 
Haight informed Mr. Olsen about a County sponsored voluntee· 
program known as RSVP (Retired Senior Volunteer Program), a· 
asked Mr. Olsen if he would be interested in participating :· 
this program. (Transcript, p. 6) RSVP is a County sponso;• 
volunteer program designed to give opportunity to individuals· 
utilize their talents and experience for the benefit of t'•. 
community. (Transcript, p. 64) 
This program is neither operate] nnr sp>11s•)rel by the• pla: 
tiff School District. The Schnol Distric-t has ci<irr>e·l to all 
RSVP volunteers to volunteer the1 r t imP tri l ,_.:its i 11 t lie S·:-• 
District. (Transcript, P· f,.J) 
In the spring of 1982, Mr. Olsen did not have any work in 
his own business and he informed Mr. Haight that he would be 
interested in participating in the RSVP program. (Transcript, 
PP· 7, 9) Mr. Olsen was then interviewed by officials of Moun-
tain View High School and informed that they would be happy to 
have him participate in the volunteer program at the High School. 
(Transcript, p. 35) At the conclusion of his interview, Mr. 
Olsen understood that the program in which he would be partici-
pating was a volunteer program. (Transcript, p. 35) 
RSVP (County) personnel gave Mr. Olsen a lunch ticket which 
entitled him to a daily lunch in the school cafeteria. (Trans-
cript, p. 15) Mr. Olsen was also allowed to continue to use the 
in the school shop for personal projects so long as his 
use did not interfere with the students. 
Mr. Olsen did not have a written or oral contract of employ-
ment with Mountain View High School or Board of Education of 
Alpine School District. (Transcript, pp. 34, 35) He did not 
receive any wage or monetary remuneration for his services nor 
did he have any expectation of being paid for his services. 
(Transcript, pp. 36-40) 
Neither the Board of Education of Alpine School District nor 
Mountain View High School had any control over or right to con-
trol the hours that Mr. Olsen spent in the high school. He had 
no hours. Mr. Olsen could come and go as he pleased. 
(Transcript, p. 38) 
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Neither the Board of Education of Alpine School District nor 
Mountain view High School had any control over or right to con-
trol what Mr. Olsen told the students nor was he required to 
attend faculty meetings. (Transcript, pp. 38-39) 
In April 1982, Mr. Olsen was asked by Mountain View High 
School to substitute teach in the School Shop class for a period 
of one day. Prior to substitute teaching on that day, Mr. Olsen 
signed the forms necessary to substitute teach for one day and at 
the end of the day that he taught he signed a time card. Mr. 
Olsen has been paid for the day that he acted as a substitute 
teacher. (Transcript, p. 17) 
On May 20, 1982 Mr. Olsen suffered an accidental injury in 
the Mountain View High School Shop. Mr. Olsen's injury occurre8 
during the lunch hour and while he was working on a personal 
project. (Transcript, p. 22) It is for this injury that Mr. 
Olsen seeks worker's compensation benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AT THE TIME OF HIS ACCIDENT, THE DEFENDANT, WAYNE A. OLSEK, 
WAS A VOLUNTEER AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Utah Code Ann. 35-1-45 provides that workmen's compensation 
benefits shall be paid to "Every employee . .who is injured 
ment. 
. by accident arising out of or in the course of his employ-
(emphasis added) 
The term "employee" is defined by Utah Code Ann. 35-1-43 as: 
(1) Every elective and appointive officer, anl 
every other person, in the service of the stcite, 
or of any county, city, town or schr•nl <listrir-t 
within the state, serving tf-1e stn.tP, -it;.·, 
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town or school district therein under any election 
or appointment or under any contract of hire, 
exp:ess or implied, written or oral, including all 
officers and employees of the state institutions 
of learning. 
The question of when one is an employee for workers compen-
sation purposes has been dealt with in numerous Utah Supreme 
Court decisions. This question has generally been raised in the 
context of cases dealing with the distinction between employees 
and independent contractors; however, the same general legal 
principles apply to cases dealing with the distinction between 
employees and volunteers. 
In Bingham City Corporation, et al., v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, 66 Ut. 390, 243 P. 113 (1926), the Utah Supreme 
Court dealt with the distinction between employees and volunteers 
for the first time. In that case a volunteer fireman was killed 
in the performance of his duties and the issue before the court 
was whether or not the fireman was an employee of Bingham City. 
In addressing this issue, the court set forth the following test: 
p. 114. 
The usual test by which to determine whether one 
person is another's employee is whether the al-
leged employer possesses the power to control the 
other person in respect to the services performed 
by the latter and the power to discharge him for 
disobedience or misconduct. Under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act it is also essential that some 
consideration be in fact paid or payable to the 
employee. The purpose of the act is to provide 
compensation for earning power, lost in industry, 
and the only hasis for computing compensation is 
the ability of the employee in the parti-
cular employment out of which the loss arises. In 
short, the term employee indicates a person hired 
to work for wa es as the em lo er ma direct. 
emphasis adCleri 
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Applying this test, the court held that the volunteer fire-
man was not an employee and thus was not entitled to benefits 
under the Workers Compensation Act. 
This test has been reiterated numerous times. In Harry L. 
Young & Sons, Inc., v. Ashton, Utah, 538 P.2d 316 (1975), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
p.318. 
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who is 
hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed 
rate, to perform the employer's work as directed 
by the employer and who is subject to a compara-
tively high degree of control in performing those 
duties. 
The intent of the parties is also one of the most important 
factors to consider in attempting to determine whether or not an 
employer-employee relationship exists. Rustler Lodge v. Indus-
trial Commission, Utah, 562 P.2d 227 (1977). 
In summary, the principal tests by which to determine whe-
ther the defendant is an employee of the Board of Education of 
Alpine School District or a volunteer are ( 1) intent of the 
parties, (2) power or right to control, and (3) payment of corn-
pensation. 
These tests will be treated in sequence. 
INTENT 
The clear intent of the parties was that the defendant was a 
volunteer. 
The defendant testified that he anJ Mr. Hai']ht, the slier 
teacher, were good friends and that in thP fall of 19Rl 'Ir 
Haight was allowing the to use the shnp ey 1iip:nent f 
his personal projects. WhilP the W'ciS >A' r'<1nl1 
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personal project, Mr. Haight told him about the RSVP volunteer 
program and asked the defendant if he would be interested in 
participating in this program. The defendant testified as 
follows: 
MR. SHAUNHNESSY: Q. Now beginning in the winter 
of 1981, were there discussions held about what 
they called the RSVP program at the school? 
A. As I worked on this project last fall, Mr. 
Haight informed me about the RSVP program. A 
volunteer instructor program of some sort, which 
is offered by the District. He explained to me 
that they had a fellow who had been helping them 
with this program. The program allowed the school 
to bring in an individual to help them with the 
instruction of regularly-scheduled classes for 
high school students. They had an individual who 
was helping with that, but his health was kind of 
poor and they didn't know whether he would be back 
after Christmas. He asked me if I might be inter-
ested in helping them out that way. I told him 
that I didn't know what kind of work I would have 
in my business, but that I would think about it 
and let him know after Christmas." 
(Transcript, pp. 6, 7) 
The defendant then testified that after the Christmas break 
he advised Mr. Haight that he would be interested in participa-
ting in the volunteer program. (Transcript, p. 9) 
The RSVP program is a county-sponsored volunteer program. 
It is neither sponsored nor operated by the School District. At 
the request of the county, the School District has agreed to 
allow RSVP volunteers to volunteer services within the district. 
After the defendant indicated that he was interested in 
participating in the RSVP program, Mr. Haight advised the clai-
mant that it would be necessary to have him cleared by the school 
ajrinistration. "In case he punched a student or something, 
(Transcript, pp. 9,54) 
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The defendant testified that in his meeting with the viae 
principal he was informed that the program in which he would be 
participating was a volunteer program. (Transcript, p. 35) He 
stated his own understanding as follows: 
Mr· McConkie: Q. So you understood at the con-
clusion of that interview that you would be work-
ing in the volunteer program of the high school? 
A. Yes. 
(Transcript, p. 35) 
CONTROL 
The defendant presented no evidence whatsoever and there are 
no Findings of Fact that the School District had any control or 
right to control his actions. To the contrary, the record shows 
that the District did not have any power or right to control 
defendant in respect to the services he performed. 
The School District did not have any control over the hours 
that he spent at the school (Transcript, p. 38). The 
could come and go as he pleased. The School District did nc'. 
keep a record of his activities or hours. The defendant hac 
neither record keeping nor reporting requirements. He wasn't 
required to attend Faculty meetings. 
The defendant also testified that the School District die 
not have any right to control what he taught the sturlentS· 
(Transcript, PP· 38, 39) 
PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION 
The defendant did not receive any wage or remuner"1t ion fo1 
his services at the High School. N·• taxes were withheld and n 
reporting requirements were pres<0 nt · 
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testified that he did not have any expectation of being paid for 
his services. (Transcript pp. 39,40) 
The lunch ticket that defendant was given and which entitled 
him to a free lunch in the school cafeteria was an RSVP lunch 
ticket and was given to him by RSVP personnel. The School Dis-
trict had an agreement with RSVP that volunteers would be given a 
free lunch so that volunteers wouldn't have to leave the facility 
or bring their lunch. The school district testified that this 
was just a gratuity for volunteer services. 
In Hall v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 154 Col. 47, 
38 7 P. 2d 899 ( 196 3), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
provision of lunch to a hospital volunteer worker did not make 
the volunteer an employee. 
In Kershaw v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., Utah, 561 P.2d 
683 (1977) the court stated: 
p. 685. 
Purely voluntary services are not compensable and 
services rendered out of a moral obligation are 
not compensable. Services rendered gratui taus ly 
and without expectation by both parties that com-
pensation be paid are not compensable. 
The decision of the Industrial Commission that there was an 
"implied contract of hire" between the Board of Education of 
Alpine School District and the defendant, Wayne A. Olsen, is 
arhitrary, capricious, and is not supported in law or fact. 
There were no contractual relations whatever between the 
Board of Education of Alpine School District and the defendant . 
The defendant testified that he did not have a " . written 
c(1ntract ()f any kind .. " with the District and that he had not 
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even communicated with officials of the District until after his 
accident. (Transcript, p. 35) 
He testified further that he had an agreement with officials 
of Mountain View High School that he would be working in a volun-
teer program. In this regard, the defendant testified as fol-
lows: 
Mr. McConkie: Q. Did you have an oral contract 
with the Alpine School District? 
A. Well, I had an agreement with the vice-princi-
pals, which I assume represent the school dis-
trict. 
Q. Did you have any agreement with the school 
district itself? Officials of the school dis-
trict? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever have any communications with 
officials of the school district? 
A. Not until after my accident. 
Q. You say you had an agreement with the princi-
pal, or the vice-principal, at Mountain View High 
School. Would you describe briefly the agreement 
that you had there? 
A. That just came about as a result of the inter-
view which we have mentioned, wherein they ask me 
personal questions, and ask for my qualifications 
as a woodworker. I don't remember that they asked 
me anything about teaching background, but they 
did want to know about my wood-working experience. 
At the conclusion of this interview, they told mP 
that they would be glad to have me work in this 
volunteer program for the high school. 
Q. So you understood at the conclusic•n nf tlnt 
interview that you would be working in the volun-




In order to find that there was an implied contract between the 
defendant and the school district, all of the facts must be 
examined to determine the intention of both parties. Kershaw v. 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., supra. By the defendant's own 
admission, his understanding of his agreement reached with school 
officials in his meeting was that he would be working in the 
volunteer program of the high school. 
In Rasmussen v. United States Steel Co., 1 U.2d 291, 265 
P.2d 1002 (1954) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
p.1004. 
.the distinction between express and implied 
in fact contracts largely is a difference only in 
mode of expression. A contract is express or 
implied by reason of the expression of offer and 
acceptance,--whether there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent, by words or actions or both, which 
reasonably are interpretable as indicating an 
intention to make a bargain with certain terms or 
terms which reasonably may be made certain. The 
elements are basically identical in both cases, 
although the evidentiary facts may be expressed 
differently." 
In McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Ut. 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952), 
the court restated the general quantum meruit or implied contract 
rule as follows: 
It is appreciated that this rule should not be 
applied to bind one under implied contra7t who 
merely permits services to be rendered him, or 
accept benefits from another, under such circum-
stances that he may reasonably assume they are 
given gratuitously. The law_ should not 
everyone to keep on guard against such possibili-
ties hy warning persons offering services that no 
pay is to be expected. It is, th":'refore, .esser:-
t ial that the court should exercise caution in 
imposing the obligations of implied contract, 
as contrasted to express contract, where the 
pint ies have actually defined and agreed to the 
-11-
p. 686. 
terms they are to be found by. With such caution 
in mind, the test for the court to apply was: 
Under all the evidence, were the circumstances 
such that the plaitiff could reasonably assume he 
was to be paid and that the defendant should have 
reasonably expected to pay for such services. 
(Emphasis added) 
The facts of this case are clear as to what the intention of 
the parties was. There was no legal duty on the part of one 
party to the other. In his Findings of Fact, even the Admini-
strative Law Judge recognized the volunteer status of the defen-
dant when he stated that ". .this case is an instance of first 
impression in the State of Utah since it appears that there is no 
provision in the Worker's Compensation Act for volunteer wor-
kers. 1 ' (Findings of Fact, p.5) Certainly the claimant has not 
shown by preponderance of the evidence that the parties intended 
to create a master-servant or employee-employer relationship. 
The claimant has testified that he worked for two days as a 
substitute teacher and that he was only paid for the second day. 
The first occasion was around the first part of April, 1982 and 
the second occasion was near the end of that same month. On the 
first occasion, it was necessary for the regular shop teacher to 
take a few of his students on a field trip. Rather than bring in 
a substitute teacher, the school administration requested that 
the shop teacher make arrangements with other teachers in the 
school to cover his classes for him. 
When the shop teacher men-
tioned this to the defendant, the defendant offered to cover the 
classes. 
On the second occasion the defendant testifiel that h• 
was formally asked to suhstitute teach anl that priGr t 
tec;-hin-
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he filled out necessary paper work in the school office. The de-
fendant has been paid for the second day. The claimant also tes-
tified that while substitute teaching, his duties were different 
than they were on each of the other days that he served in the 
school. (Transcript, p. 42) 
Assuming arguendo that the claimant did substitute teach for 
two days, this does not make the claimant an employee of the 
district for all other purposes and all other occasions. The 
most that can be said is that he was an employee on two separate 
occasions of one day each. 
The claimant's accident did not occur on either day that the 
claimant claims he was substitute teaching and therefore did not 
arise out of or in the course of his employment as required by 
U.C.A. 35-1-45 (1953). 
The only reasonable conclusion that can be reached from a 
review of all of the facts and circumstances of this case, in-
eluding the claimant's own admissions, is that the claimant was a 
volunteer and not an employee of the Alpine School District at 
the time of his injury. 
POINT II 
WAYNE A. OLSEN, AS A VOLUNTEER WORKER, IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO WORKERS COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
The administrative law judge took judicial notice of the 
fact that the legislature in two separate instances has made 
provisions for volunteer workers to receive workers compensation 
benefits. More specifically, he referred to U.C.A. §49-6A-31 
wherein the legislature made provision for volunteer firemen to 
workers compensation benefits and U.C.A. §63-34-11 (1953) 
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wherein the legislature made provision for volunteers with the 
Department of Natural Resources to receive workers compensation 
benefits. 
Based upon this, the administrative law judge con-
cluded that it is the intent of the legislature to extend workers 
compensation benefits to volunteers who are injured during the 
course and scope of their voluntary labor. 
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is 
the all-important or controlling factor. Accordingly, the pri-
mary rule of construction of is to ascertain and declare 
the intention of the legilsature, and to carry such intention 
into effect. Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 U.2d 337, 411 
P.2d 831 (1966). In Monson v. Hall, Utah, 584 P.2d 833 (1978), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
p.835. 
One of the cardinal rules of statutory construc-
tion requires construction with the objective of 
bringing consonance to Constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, which will be congruous with 
expressed intent, and the applicability of the law 
in general. 
Statutory provisions dealing with workers compensation bene-
fits for volunteer firemen, volunteers with the Department of 
National Resources and other workers should be regarded as in 
pari materia and therefore should not be considered as isolated 
fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great, con-
nected, homogeneous system. 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, §188. 
A general principle of statutory interpretation is that the 
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. In Knowles v. Holle\', 82 W. 694, 
513 P.2d 18 (1973), the Washington Supreme Court statei: 
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If a statute specifically designates things or 
of upon which it operates, the 
maxim express10 unius est exclusio alterius" 
gives rise to an inference that all things or 
classes of things omitted from the statute were 
intentionally omitted by the legislature. 
pp.22, 23 (footnote). 
Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court in Inspiration Consoli-
dated Copper v. Industrial Commission, 118 Az. 10, 574 P.2d 478 
(1977) stated: 
p.480. 
When a statute enumerates the subjects upon which 
it is to operate, it will be construed as exclud-
ing from its effect all subjects not specifically 
mentioned. 
In other words, it must be presumed that the Utah Legisla-
ture considered the impact of the Utah Workers Compensation Act 
upon volunteers and that they made a conscious decision to lessen 
that impact upon volunteer firemen and volunteers working with 
the Department of Natural Resources. However, under the maxim 
stated above, it must be presumed that the legislature considered 
other volunteers as well and made a determination not to provide 
workers compensation benefits for all such volunteers. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is clear that the claimant is a volunteer and not 
an employee of the Alpine School District. The extention of 
workers compensation benefits to all volunteers has serious im-
pl ications for school districts and other non-profit or charit-
able organizations who rely on volunteers for many services. 
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We submit that only those volunteers specifically 
in the Utah statutes should be entitled to receive workers cofl'-
pensation benefits. 
Mr. Olsen has not met the burden of showing that he was 
.injured. . by accident arising out of or in the course o'. 
his employment. U .C .A. 35-1-45. 
The decision of the Industrial Commission erroneously award-
ing him compensation in this case should be reversed and the 
claim of Mr. Olsen should be dismissed. 
Dated this of May, 1983. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
David M. McConl<ie 
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